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A High Stakes Mistake:
Ignoring the IEP Team's
Recommendations in Implementing
California's High School Exit Exams
A. ANGELIQUE AITKEN*

Although federal and California law guarantee each elementary
and secondary student a "free and appropriate education,"
California has decided to implement high stakes exit exams that
arguably deny students this right. A "free and appropriate
education" includes the right for students to be afforded an
opportunity to earn a high school diploma. The Individualized
Education Plan (IEP) team members are guardians of a child's free
and appropriate education and best understand the disabled
student's academic abilities and achievements. Thus, this team
should be afforded discretion in determining which graduation
options the student pursues and how these options are
implemented. By deferring to the IEP team, students with learning
disabilities would have equal access to learning, equal opportunity
to demonstrate their knowledge, and equal privileges that
accompany a high school graduation.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2003.

B.S., La Sierra

University, 1999. I am grateful to Professor Hazel G. Beh for her guidance in the
development of this paper. I also thank Gary Chartier and Michelle L. Rutledge for their
editorial comments on earlier drafts. Finally, thanks to Ivy Suriyopas and the Hastings
Race and Poverty Law Journal members for their hard work in preparing this Note for
publication.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the California Legislature authorized the development
of a high stakes exam, the California High School Exit Exam
(CAHSEE). An exam is a high stakes exit exam if a student must
pass it in order to graduate from high school.1 The California
Education Code requires all high school students to pass the exam
in order to be eligible to receive a diploma. 2 Shortly after the
implementation of the CAHSEE, Disability Rights Advocates helped
file a class action lawsuit asserting that the test, as implemented,
discriminated against students with learning disabilities because the
California Department of Education (CDE) did not provide
appropriate accommodations as required by federal law. 3
According to the CDE, it had the authority to institute the exams as
a graduation requirement. 4 The CDE further asserted policy reasons
to justify its refusal to accommodate disabled students, including
the necessity to implement exit exams.5 The CDE contended that
public policy favored the CAHSEE because a high stakes exam
would ensure California's students were academically competitive
with students nationally and internationally. 6 Initially, California
refused to accommodate many disabled students because it claimed
the state had the authority to set educational standards and,
according to CDE, the California High School Exit Exam was
consistent with federal law. 7 In Chapman v. California Department of
Education,8 a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring the CDE to allow disabled students to take the CAHSEE
with the same accommodations and modifications they are allowed
on classroom tests and assignments.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court's
preliminary injunction because it found that most of the plaintiffs'
claims were not ripe for adjudication since the plaintiff students
only "allege[d] potential future harms caused by the possible denial
of a waiver of CAHSEE requirements or of a diploma." However,
1. The Dangerous Consequences of High-Stakes Standardized Testing, Fair Test: The
National Center for Fair & Open Testing, at http://www.fairtest.org/facts/
Dangerous%20Consequences.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
2. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 229 F. Supp. 2d 981, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
Defendant's Brief at 3, Chapman (No. 01-01780).
3. Plaintiff's Brief at 2.
4. Defendant's Brief at 34.
5. Id. at 33-35.
6.Id.
7. Id. at 22-28.
8. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., No. 01-01780, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2003).
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beginning with the Class of 2006, once the CDE implements the
CAHSEE as a true high stakes exam and requires successful
completion of the exam to earn a diploma, a disabled student's
claim will become ripe.
Part I of this paper will discuss the legal requirements for
accommodations for students with disabilities under federal law.
Part II will analyze the trends in educational accountability, describe
the nature of high school exit exams, explain California's approach
to achieve educational accountability through the administration of
high school exit exams, and explore how other courts have applied
federal law to protect the rights of disabled students while allowing
states to achieve educational accountability. Part III will review the
Chapman case which held disabled students would be permitted to
take the exam with accommodations in accordance with their
established 504 Plan. It will describe the contentions of the parties
under state and federal law, discuss the broad application of the
district court's decision, and the effect that the Ninth Circuit's
decision had on the district court's ruling. Part IV will focus on the
ways in which states can apply the California district court's ruling
to ensure a free and appropriate education for disabled students.
I.

Disability Laws: Federal Laws Mandate that Disabled
Students Must be Afforded Appropriate Educational
Opportunities

A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Ensures
Disabled Students a Free and Appropriate Education
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)9 is the
cornerstone of special education law in the United States. Congress
enacted the IDEA to replace the Education for All Handicapped
ChildrenAct of 1975 (EHA) because Congress found that the needs of
students with disabilities were not being met adequately under the
EHA.10 The low educational expectations educators placed on
disabled students concerned Congress. 1 Consequently, it sought to
create more educational opportunities that were readily available
for disabled students. 12 By adopting the IDEA, Congress was
successful in creating more meaningful educational access to an
3
increased number of disabled students.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-87 (2004).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(4).
Id.
Id. § 1400(c)(5).
Id. § 1400(c)(3).
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The IDEA's primary purpose is to compel states to provide a
"free and appropriate education" to all eligible students and
provide a way of including parents and specialists in the process of
educating students with disabilities. The Department of Education's
regulations define a "free and appropriate education" accordingly:
As used in this part, the term free appropriate public education or
FAPE means special education and related services that - (a) Are
provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge; (b) Meet the standards of the SEA
[state education agency], including the requirements of this part;
(c) Include preschool, elementary school, or secondary school
education in the State; and (d) Are provided in conformity with
an individualized education program (IEP) that meets the
requirements of sections 300.340 - 300.350.14
This Act is applicable to states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 The IDEA delegates the power to
implement its provisions to the states, but conditions each state's
receipt of federal education funds on the state's implementation of
the requirements enumerated in the IDEA.16 It requires that a state
provide each eligible disabled student with a free and appropriate
education, a full opportunity to meet educational goals, 17 and an
individualized education plan.is A free and appropriate education
includes a right to reasonable and appropriate educational
accommodations to ensure that a disabled student has a genuine
opportunity to achieve academic success. 19 Each state must also
provide disabled students and parents with procedural safeguards,
14.
15.
B.C. L.
16.
17.

34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (2001).
Christopher M. Morrison, Note, High-Stakes Tests and Students with Disabilities, 41
REV. 1139, 1146 (2000).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2004).
The IDEA provides in pertinent part:
A State is eligible for assistance under this part [20 U.S.C. §§ 14001487] for a fiscal year if the State demonstrates to the satisfaction of
the Secretary that the State has in effect policies and procedures to
ensure that it meets each of the following conditions:
(1) Free appropriate public education.
(A) In general. A free appropriate public education is
available to all children with disabilities residing in the State
between the ages of 3 and 21 ....
(2) Full educational opportunity goal. The State has established a
goal of providing full educational opportunity to all children with
disabilities and a detailed timetable for accomplishing that goal.
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a) (2004).
18. Id. § 1412(a)(4).
19. See id. § 1412(a)(17).
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and confidentiality. 20
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Prohibits Discrimination
and Requires Reasonable Accommodations
States must comply not only with the IDEA, but also with
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), which prohibits
discrimination based on an individual's disability. 21 Like the IDEA,
Section 504 applies to states, including state-sponsored school
systems, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 22 According to Section 504:
B.

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States... [shall] solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
any Executive agency or by the United
activity conducted by
States Postal Service. 23
The purpose of Section 504 is to allow persons with disabilities to
"live life as fully as they are able" without discrimination by
providing equal opportunities. 24 In the academic setting, Section
504 compels school districts to provide disabled students with
programs and services equal to those provided to their peers. 25 The
statute accomplishes this by providing disabled students with
opportunities to reach the same level of academic achievement or
26
other comparable benefits as their classmates.
C. The Role of the IDEA and Section 504 in the Education of the
Disabled
Section 504 protects the civil rights of a disabled student by
20. Id. § 1412(a)(6), (a)(8).
21. In deciding whether a plaintiff is a handicapped individual within the meaning
of Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-87 (1998), Congress intended that determination
of whether impairment substantially limits major life activity to be made without regard
to any medication taken by the plaintiff, even if medication completely controls
symptoms; additionally, plaintiff can establish that she is handicapped if she can
demonstrate that she has record of such impairment, even if impairment does not
presently limit one or more major life activities. Liff v. Sec'y of Transp., CIV.A.930118TFH/DAR, 1994 WL 579912, at *34(D.D.C. 1994); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2002).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 794(i)(2); Morrison, supra note 15, at 1146.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794(i)(2); Morrison, supra note 15, at 1146.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794(i)(3).
25. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1998); Morrison, supra note 15, at 1146.
26. Morrison, supra note 15, at 1146.
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protecting her from discrimination, whereas the IDEA provides
specialized services to students with disabilities. 27 Even if a student
is not eligible for special education services under the IDEA, she
may still be protected under the broader definition of disability
encompassed in Section 504.28 While there are many similarities
between Section 504 and the IDEA, there are some differences that
affect the rights of disabled students. 29 Most importantly, Section
504 aims to eliminate barriers that exclude disabled students from
participating in the classroom, whereas the IDEA is more remedial
in nature. 30 Specifically, in addition to traditional classroom lessons,
the IDEA requires that schools provide specialized programs and
31
services to disabled students.
The IDEA limits how many students are eligible for special
education services by employing a heightened qualification
standard as compared to Section 504.32 The IDEA specifically lists
which disabilities qualify disabled students for special education
services. 33 Under Section 504, the standard is whether the student is
handicapped in such a way that impairs a major life activity. 34 A
major life activity includes, but is not limited to eating, sleeping,
dressing, walking, and learning.35 Since Section 504 includes
27. S.J. Rosenfeld, Section 504 and IDEA: Basic Similarities and Differences, LDOnline at
http://www.ldonline.com.org/ld-indepth/legal-legislative/edlaw504.html
(Nov. 12,
2004).
28. Student's rights under section 504 and IDEA are not equivalent due to statutory
differences. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(19) (2002).
29. Rosenfeld, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The IDEA provides:
(3) Child with a disability.
(A) In general
The term "child with a disability" means a child (i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments
(including deafness), speech or language impairments,
visual impairments (including blindness), serious
emotional disturbance (hereinafter referred to as
"emotional disturbance"), orthopedic impairments,
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments,
or
specific
learning
disabilities;
and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and
related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2004).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2002).
35. The regulations provide: "Handicappedperson - (1) Handicappedpersons means any
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment." 34 C.F.R. § 104.30) (2003).
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learning as a major life activity, many students not eligible for
special education services under IDEA would qualify for protection
under Section 504.36
While the IDEA's heightened eligibility standards include fewer
students than Section 504, the scope of services and benefits
provided by the IDEA is greater. According to the IDEA, an eligible
student is entitled to special education and related services. 37 Thus,
her school must provide her with specifically designed instruction
to meet her particular academic needs. 38
This includes
accommodations within the classroom instructional setting, and
may also include related services such as speech/language therapy,
occupational therapy, adaptive physical education, and instruction
in other settings such as the home. 39 In contrast, Section 504 acts as
a protection for the student, disallowing any discrimination based
on her disability. 40 Thus, students with a disability, that impairs the
major life activity of learning but who do not qualify for special
education services, may be entitled to other accommodations
designed both to protect students from discrimination in the
classroom and create educational opportunities that can help them
reach the same level of achievement as their classmates. 41
An additional difference between the two statutes is that the
enforcement mechanism incorporated into the IDEA is stronger than
in Section 504. If a state does not implement the mandates of the
IDEA, it will not receive the designated federal funds. 42 On the
other hand, schools do not receive any funding for compliance with
Section 504. 43 Without the incentive of federal funds, schools are
less motivated to accommodate disabled students that are not
eligible under the IDEA. 44 Thus, while a state's legal obligation to
students protected under Section 504 is no less than their obligation

36. Rosenfeld, supra note 27.
37. The IDEA provides:
(A) In general. All children with disabilities residing in the State,
including children with disabilities attending private schools,
regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and who are in need
of special education and related services, are identified, located,
and evaluated and a practical method is developed and
implemented to determine which children with disabilities are
currently receiving needed special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2004).
38. Id. § 1412.
39. Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002).
41. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(2), .31, .34 (2003).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a); Rosenfeld, supra note 27.
43. Rosenfeld, supra note 27.
44. Id.
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under the IDEA, as a practical matter, it is more difficult to ensure
45
compliance.
1.

The Concept of Academic Accommodations
Accommodations and modifications 46 are central to ensuring a
free and appropriate education for the disabled student.
Accommodations allow students to learn information in different
formats specially designed to help them achieve educational
success. 47 The student can then take in information and/or
communicate his knowledge back to the teacher. 48 These changes
do not alter or lower the standards or expectations for a subject or
test.49 By contrast, modifications adjust the delivery, content, or
instructional level of the subject matter a student is expected to learn
or the tests she is expected to take.50 Modifications result in
changing or reducing academic expectations and involve the use of
different standards for students with disabilities compared to other
5
students. '
2.

Importance of the Individualized Education Plan
The IDEA features several requirements designed to guarantee
free and appropriate education to disabled students. One of the
central requirements is the Individualized Education Plan (IEP)52
required for each student and the IEP team responsible for
implementing this plan. An IEP is a written statement describing an
individualized education program designed for a particular
disabled student.53 The IEP team is a group consisting of the
parents and educational professionals who create the IEP
document.5 4 The IEP document must include the student's present
level of academic performance,55 her annual academic goals and
45. Id.
46. See Assessment Accommodations Glossary, Family Education Network, at
http://www.teachervision.fen.com/lesson-plans/lesson-4132.html?detoured=1
(last
visited Oct. 22, 2003). Although these terms have technically different definitions, not all
educators recognize this and frequently use these terms interchangeably. Id.
47. Glossary
of
Assessment
Terms,
Schwab
Learning
at
http://www.schwablearning.org/articles.asp?r=384 (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
48. Id.
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2004).
50. Glossary of Assessment Terms, supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. Analogous to the IDEA's IEP is section 504's 504 Plan.
For simplicity,
hereinafter, I will use the term "IEP," although the term "IEP" can usually be substituted
with 504 Plan.
53. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2004).
54. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
55. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
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short-term benchmark measurements, 56 and a description of
approved accommodations needed to enable the student to meet
these goals.5 7 It must also state to what extent the student will be
taught with non-disabled students in a regular education class and
to what extent she will receive instruction in a one-to-one
environment or in a special education classroom setting.5 8 In
developing the IEP, the team is required to consider the concerns of
the student's parents, the student's most recent evaluations, and any
special factors59 that would affect the student's educational
success. 60 The IDEA requires the team to review the IEP document
at least once a year to ensure that the student's goals are appropriate
and are being reached. 61 During a review the IEP team must
address any expected inability to reach annual education goals and
revise the IEP goals as appropriate. 62 The team must also consider
any reevaluations, the student's anticipated needs, the parent's
concerns, or other matters. 63
The IDEA specifically requires that the IEP contain a statement
of any necessary accommodations or modifications "in the
administration of State or district-wide assessments of student
achievement that are needed in order for the child to participate in
such assessments ...."64 It also requires that the IEP document
contain the beginning date for such services and accommodations
and the "anticipated frequency, location, and duration of those
services and modifications." 65
Under the IDEA, if the parents do not agree with the rest of the
team about the appropriateness of suggested accommodations, the
parents may reject and not agree to the IEP and submit the issue to a
neutral third party for review. 66

56. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii).
57. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(v)(I).
58. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iv).
59. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(B). Such special factors include behavior, English proficiency,
visual impairment, communication, or assertive technology issues or needs.
60. Id. § 1414(d)(3).
61. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).
62. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii).
63. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii).
64. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(v) (emphasis added).
65. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vi).
66. Id. § 1415; 34 C.F.R. § 300.507 (2001); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56501(a) (West
2000).
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II. Educational Accountability
A. Recent Federal Legislation and National Concern Compelled
States to Raise Educational Standards
Recent federal legislation has encouraged states to raise
educational standards. In March of 1996, Congress reauthorized the
Goals 2000: Educate America Act. 67 This Act is designed to provide a
framework for states to promote "coherent, nationwide, systematic
education reform." 68 The framework intended to create a "vision of
excellence" 69 and establish "high quality, internationally competitive
content and student performance standards... "70
The Act
specifically defines "all students" and "all children" as including
students with disabilities. 71 More recently, Congress approved the
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 which went into effect in January
2002.72 It requires that every child "have a fair, equal, and
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach,
at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic
achievement standards and state academic assessments." 73 Like the
Goals 2000: Educate America Act, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
seeks to meet the educational needs of at-risk and disadvantaged
children, specifically those with disabilities. 74
B.

State Implementation of High Stakes Exit Exams

1.

High Stakes Exit Exams Generally
After the passage of these education reform acts, 75 state
legislators were able to move forward with plans to implement
statewide testing and assessment procedures. 76 By 2008, 23 states
plan to require students to pass a statewide assessment in order to
receive a diploma. 77 These tests are referred to as exit exams,
67. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084 (2004).
68. Id. § 5801(1).
69. Id. § 5801(6)(A).
70. Id. § 5801(6)(B).
71. Id. § 5802(a)(1).
72. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6055 (2002).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 6301(2).
75. Id..§ 6301-6055; 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084 (2004).
76. The No Child Left Behind Act requires large-scale testing and assessment of
students in grades 3 and 8 in mathematics and reading. See Public Agenda: Reality Check
2002,
Education
Week
on
the
Web
(Mar.
6,
2002),
available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/ew-printstory.cfm?slug=25realitycheck.h21.
77. Tamar Lewin, In Testing, One Size May Not Fit All, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at
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certification exams, or competency exams. 78 These assessments are
sometimes called "high stakes exams" because states use them to
make important determinations about a student's academic status
such as high school graduation or grade promotion. 79 By definition,
a high stakes exam is more important in determining a student's
future than any grades or any other kind of assessment.8 0 An exam
is a high stakes exit exam if a student must pass it in order to
graduate from high school.81 Without a diploma, students will not
possess the necessary prerequisite for acceptance into colleges, the
82
military, or other careers and will therefore forego higher salaries.
According to the National Center for Fair & Open Testing,
"[students] who leave high school without a diploma begin their
adult lives at an enormous disadvantage in terms of career options,
potential for achievement and, not least of all, self-esteem." 83
California'sAlternative
In response to the national concern of educational standards in
the United States, California was one of the first states to implement
a statewide high stakes high school exit exam. 84 The California
Education Code (Code) requires students with disabilities to take
the California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE) in accordance with
the IDEA and Section 504.85 However, the Code provides that the
CAHSEE "shall be administered with appropriate accommodations,
6
where necessary."8
The Code provides for remediation services for disabled and
non-disabled students who do not exhibit "sufficient progress
toward passing the [CAHSEE]," 8 7 which would include students
who have been provided accommodations in their IEPs.
Supplemental instruction must be given outside the student's
2.

A16. For a detailed report on exit exams nationwide, see Theresa Clarke, GraduationExit
available
at
Association,
Governors'
National
Exam
Matrix,
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/EXITEXAMMATRIX.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
78. Paul T. O'Neill, Special Education and High Stakes Testing for High School
Graduation:An Analysis of Current Law and Policy, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 185, 186 (2001).
79. The Dangerous Consequences of High-Stakes Standardized Testing, Fair Test: The
National Center for Fair & Open Testing, at http://www.fairtest.org/
facts/Dangerous%20Consequences.html (last visited May 13, 2004).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 60850(a), 60851(a) (West 2000); Clarke, supra note 77.
85. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(g).

86. Id.
87. Id. § 60851(f).
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normal curriculum: it may be offered during elective class periods,88
during the summer, before or after school, or on the weekend.8 9
Students are to receive extensive additional learning opportunities
so they will not only prepare to pass but also make progress toward
their other educational goals. 90
3.

Requirement to Make Accommodations: FoundationalCase Law and
Scholarship
Courts generally defer to the school districts and educators
where questions of educational policy are concerned.
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system
of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint... By
and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the
control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and
sharply implicate basic constitutional values.91
Courts have, however, intervened "when a governmental
educational institution acts to deprive an individual of a significant
interest in either liberty or property."9 2 Courts consistently
intervene and uphold students' rights when schools act illegally, to
ensure that students do not lose their constitutional rights "at the
schoolhouse gate." 93 In the context of high stakes testing, courts are
ready to intervene when schools violate a student's due process
rights of property and liberty. 94
In the seminal decision of Debra P. v. Turlington,95 the Fifth
Circuit created a guide for the courts to follow in assessing
challenges to high stakes exams. 96 In an effort to raise the quality of
88. Id. § 60853(b).
89. Id. § 37252(e).
90. Supplemental instruction shall be provided to any pupil who does not
demonstrate sufficient progress toward passing the exit examination. To the extent that
school districts have aligned their curriculum with the state academic content standards
adopted by the State Board of Education, the curriculum for supplemental instruction
shall reflect those standards and shall be designed to assist the pupils to succeed on the
exit examination. Id. § 60851(f).
91. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see also O'Neill, supra note 78, at
196.
92. Bd. of Educ. v. Ambach, 436 N.Y.S.2d 564, 571-72 (1981); see also O'Neill, supra
note 78, at 196.
93. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see also O'Neill, supra
note 78, at 196.
94. O'Neill, supra note 78, at 195-202.
95. 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
96. O'Neill, supra note 78, at 197.
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public education, Florida enacted state laws that required students
pass the examination before receiving a high school diploma. 97 The
plaintiff class contested the constitutionality of the state law that
required students to pass a high school exit exam because of the
test's disproportionate impact on blacks. 98 The court held that
students had a property interest in a high school diploma. 99
Although education has not been recognized as a fundamental right
and thereby does not trigger strict scrutiny, "it is clear that if the
state does provide an educational system, it must do so in a nondiscriminatory fashion." 100 The court noted the Supreme Court's
holding in Goss v. Lopezl 01 that the state must recognize that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause protects the student's property
right to a public education. 102 Further, the court found the state's
education laws created an expectation on the part of the student
thereby creating the student's property interest. 03 Plaintiff students
believed that if they completed the high school curriculum, they
would be awarded a diploma.104 Since the state created an
education system based on a mutual expectation that attendance
and completing course requirements would result in a diploma, the

97. Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 400 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
At the time of the trial of [Debra P.], the examination, the SAT II,
98.
had been administered three times. The failure statistics showed a
greater impact on black students than on white students. In the
Fall, 1977 administration, 78% of the black students taking the
exam failed one or more sections of the test as compared with 25%
of the white students. Of the 4,480 black students taking the test
for the second time in Fall, 1978, 74% failed one or both sections.
Twenty-five percent of the whites retaking the test failed. On the
mathematics section alone, 46% of the blacks retaking the test
failed. The results of the third administration in Spring, 1978,
which were released during trial, indicated that 60% of the blacks
taking the mathematics exam for the third time failed as compared
with 36% of the whites. In May, 1979, of the approximately 91,000
high school seniors in Florida public schools, 3,466, or 20.049% of
the black students had not passed the test as compared with 1,342,
or 1.9% of the white students.
Id. at 401.
99. It is clear that in establishing a system of free public education and in making
school attendance mandatory, the state has created an expectation in the students. From
the students' point of view, the expectation is that if a student attends school during
those required years, and indeed more, and if he takes and passes the required courses,
he will receive a diploma. This is a property interest as that term is used constitutionally.
See id. at 403-04.
100. Id. at 403.
101. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
102. Debra P., 644 F.2d at 403.
103. Id. at 404.
104. Id.
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court required the state to provide adequate notice and sufficient
educational opportunities to the students before implementing the
high stakes exams. 105 Therefore, Debra P. created the standard for
review of cases dealing with discrimination in the context of high
school exit exams by creating a property interest in a diploma.
A parallel case, Board of Education v. Ambach, 10 6 focused on the
07
property interests of disabled students in a high school diploma
The court in Ambach found that although the analysis in Debra P.
focused on the property and liberty interests of black students, the
arguments are analogous to situations where there is a
disproportionate impact on disabled students. 08 The parents of two
students appealed a decision that invalidated their children's
diplomas because they had not passed the New York high school
exit exam. 09 Instead of requiring the students to pass the exit exam
the school initially awarded the disabled students' diplomas upon
the fulfillment of their IEP requirements. 110 However, after being
awarded their diplomas, the students received a letter indicating
that their diplomas were invalid because they had not completed
the exit exam."' The court, relying on the circuit court's opinion in
Debra P., held that a high school diploma represented a legitimate
property interest because the students would have suffered grave
detriment due to diminished employment opportunities." 2 The
105. Debra P. further held that the state had not shown that the test had instructional
validity.
We find, based upon stipulated facts, that because the state had
not made any effort to make certain whether the test covered
material actually studied in the classrooms of the state and
because the record is insufficient in proof on that issue, the case
must be remanded for further findings. If the test covers material
not taught the students, it is unfair and violates the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States
Constitution.
Id. at 402.
106. 436 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1981).
107. Id. at 572.
108. Id. at 573.
109. Id. at 567.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 568.
112.
The court believes that Abby and Richard had a legitimate
expectation of the receipt of a diploma therefore the diploma
represents a property interest for the purposes of the due process
protection .... The petitioners have produced testimony tending to
indicate that the denial of a diploma will have grave consequence
in respect to the future life chances of the individual petitioners,
while those factors come into the balance in determining what
standards the respondents must meet the gravity of the
deprivation is irrelevant in deciding that the Due Process Clause

Fall 2004]

A HIGH STAKES MISTAKE

court in Ambach further held that the New York law infringed on the
students' due process rights because "denial of a diploma is a
deprivation of liberty." 113 The court concluded that early notice of a
high stakes exam was necessary to not infringe on their due process
rights, and that less than two school years notice was inadequate for
disabled students to prepare for the test.114 Therefore, disabled
students also have a liberty and property interest in a high school
diploma, which cannot be infringed with less than two years notice.
Following Debra P. and Ambach, in Brookhart v. Illinois State
Board of Education,"5 the Seventh Circuit held that the lack of notice
to disabled students regarding the implementation of an exit exam
requirement violated the students' liberty interests." 6 The court,
however, limited disabled students' opportunity for a diploma
because it held that disabled students could be required to meet the
same academic requirements as non-disabled students. 1 7 Although
disabled students were to be held to the same standards, they
required more notice and more opportunities to prepare for and

applies.
Id. at 572.
113. "Further '[tihe Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of
liberty' .... By stigmatizing an individual or imposing an obstacle which forecloses his
freedom in pursuing employment opportunities the state deprives a person of a liberty
interest." Id. at 572 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)). Later the court
said:
Chancellor Theodore Black in a letter dated August 16, 1979 stated,
"To grant handicapped students a certificate (an inferior academic
award) based on attendance or any other academic standard is to
brand a group of students as second-rate and incapable of running
the race reserved for other students. Furthermore, such a
certificate or any other substitute diploma, does not provide the
recipient with the same opportunities for gaining employment or
In fact a
college entrance which accompanies a diploma."
certificate is exactly what the Board of Regents proposes to grant
to Abby and Richard ....Denial of a diploma is a deprivation of
liberty, thus the protections afforded by the due process clause are
invoked.
Id. at 573.
114.
Early notice would allow for proper consideration of whether the
goals of the students [sic] IEP should include preparation for the
[Basic Competency Test] and would afford an appropriate time for
instruction aimed at reaching that goal. The period of notice
provided, in essence less than two school years, was inadequate.
The [c]ourt is not compelled nor is it deemed provident at this
juncture to set a specific time period which would be adequate.
Id. at 574-75.
115. 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983).
116. Id. at 185.
117. Id.
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pass the exam. 118 Furthermore, the court also found that students
with disabilities had different educational goals than non-disabled
students. 119 Therefore, because the disabled students' IEPs focused
on their individual goals rather than district-wide goals, these
students were entitled to more notice than the 18 months the school
district provided. 120
4.

Recent Cases Arising Under the IDEA
Recent plaintiffs' claims have focused not only on deprivations
of constitutional due process, as did Ambach, Debra P., and Brookhart,
but also on violations of the IDEA and Section 504. For example,
Disability Rights Advocates (DRA)121 settled a case against the
Oregon State Board of Education. 122 The suit grew out of concerns
about the tenth-grade standardized test, an element of Oregon's
Certificate of Initial Mastery (CIM) testing system.123
The
consequences of not passing the CIM included 1) grade retention, 2)
mandatory summer school attendance, 3) denial of a high school
diploma, 4) denial of admission to state colleges, and 5) difficulty in
obtaining employment.124 Plaintiffs claimed the CIM discriminated
against disabled students by violating the IDEA and Section 504
because it did not take adequate account of disabled students'
needs, and therefore denied these students an opportunity to
demonstrate their knowledge1 25
According to the plaintiffs, the format of the test prevented
many students with learning disabilities, such as dyslexia, 126 from
completing portions of the test, including one that required a
handwritten essay. 127 Plaintiffs also claimed the Oregon school
118. Id. at 185-86.
119. Id. at 187.
120. Id.
121. DRA was the same plaintiff organization that prepared the California class action
suit discussed in this article. Disability Rights Advocates, Chapman v. California
Department of Education, at http://www.dralegal.org/cases/chapman (last visited
Nov. 14, 2004).
122. Disability Rights Advocates, A.S.K. v. Oregon State Board of Education, at
http://www.dralegal.org/cases/ask (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
123. O'Neill, supra note 78, at 209.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 209-10.
126. Dyslexia is an "[i]mpairment of the ability to deal with language (speaking,
reading, spelling, writing). A dyslexic may see letters, syllables, or words upside down,
reversed, blurred, backwards, or otherwise distorted," LDOnline, Glossary of Learning
Disabilities Terms, at http://www.ldonline.org/ld-indepth/glossaries/ldglossary.html
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
127. O'Neill, supra note 78, at 209-10. One effect dyslexia has on students is their
handwriting.
LDOnline,
Glossary of Learning Disabilities Terms,
at
http://www.ldonline.com (last updated Nov. 12, 2004).
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districts directly violated federal and state laws by denying students
simple and appropriate accommodations such as spell-check
programs. 128 Further, CIM tests did not meet the requirements of
the IDEA because the state violated provisions ensuring appropriate
accommodations. 129 In this suit, the plaintiffs sought to require the
state to provide appropriate test accommodations and "develop and
30
implement a coherent, non-discriminatory testing policy."
In February 2001, the parties settled the suit through mediation
and without a reported decision. 131
They agreed that an
independent panel of experts would study the CIM testing criteria
and examine how it affected plaintiff students and others similarly
situated. 132 The panel was to make recommendations designed to
ensure that learning-disabled students were afforded equal
opportunities for evaluation under the CIM.133
The panel announced their findings and recommendations after
nearly a year of research.134 It found that the State's list of viable
accommodations for students with learning disabilities was too
restrictive and did not allow a disabled student adequate
opportunity to demonstrate her knowledge. 135 In response, the
Oregon State Board of Education agreed to allow students taking
the CIM test the same accommodations permitted in accordance
with their IEP, unless the accommodations invalidated CIM test
results. 136 The Board of Education also agreed to use an alternative
means of assessing the competence of students if offering them
accommodations in connection with their completion of CIM tests
137
might invalidate the results of these tests.
138
In Rene ex rel. Rene v. Reed,
a less favorable outcome for
disabled students, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's
determination
that Indiana's
refusal to permit
accommodations for cognitively disabled students did not violate
the IDEA. In 1997, Indiana implemented the Indiana Statewide
Testing for Educational Progress (ISTEP), which mandated
128. O'Neill, supra note 78, at 210.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Disability
Rights Advocates,
Representative Cases, at
http://www.dralegal.org/cases (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
133. Disability Rights Advocates, supra note 122.
134. Id.
135. Disability Rights Advocates, Report of the Blue Ribbon Panel: Students with Learning
Disabilities and Oregon Statewide Assessment System, at http://www.dralegal.org (last
visited Oct. 25, 2004).
136. O'Neill, supra note 78, at 210.
137. Id.
138. Rene ex rel. Rene v. Reed, 751 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
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competency tests in the third, sixth, eighth, and tenth grades. 139 Part
of the tenth-grade ISTEP test includes a high stakes test, the
Graduation Qualification Exam (GQE).140
The plaintiff class
represented approximately 1000 diploma track special education
students who did not pass the GQE and were not eligible for a
waiver.141
The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to compel the
State to grant plaintiffs their high school diplomas. 142 The trial court
denied the plaintiffs' motion for injunction and the Indiana Court of
Appeals affirmed. 143 The plaintiffs made three claims in support of
their request for injunctive and declaratory relief. They maintained
that three years was not sufficient notice to prepare for the GQE so
the implementation of the exam requirement therefore violated their
due process rights.'" The plaintiffs in Rene alleged that the State
had failed adequately to prepare students for the GQE because it
did not teach them the information being tested on the exam.1 45
Finally, they asserted that they were denied appropriate
accommodations in connection with their completion of the GQE in
violation of the IDEA.146
Despite plaintiffs' assertions, the Indiana Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Indiana on all claims. 147 The court found that three
years was sufficient notice of the GQE testing requirements and
therefore did not violate the students' due process rights. 48 It found
that Indiana began adjusting the special education curriculum as far
back as 1987 as a means of preparing for the educational changes
required under ISTEP. 149 The appellate court agreed with the trial
court stating, "[gliven the multiple remediation opportunities
mandated by state law for students who take but do not pass the
GQE, the Court finds it implausible that the Plaintiff class was not
exposed throughout their high school career to the subjects tested on
the GQE."150
The appellate court in Rene affirmed the trial court's
determination that the school's refusal to afford accommodations for
cognitively disabled students did not violate the federal disability
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 738, 743.
Id.
O'Neill, supra note 78, at 207-08.
Rene, 751 N.E.2d at 738.
Id.
Id. at 741-43.
Id. at 741, 743-44.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 744.
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law. 151 The court noted that neither party pointed to case law
holding that the IDEA mandated states to accommodate students
with cognitive disabilities during high stakes testing. 152 The court
observed that a number of administrative decisions had addressed
53
the issue, but based its holding on only one of those decisions.
This administrative decision was based on facts quite different from
those at issue in Rene. In the administrative decision on which the
court relied, the hearing officer denied accommodations to a
student, in part, because the student had "never before [been]
provided that accommodation on any test, and there was no evidence
15 4
that the accommodation had ever been successful with that student."
By contrast, plaintiff Meghan Rene sought accommodations, in the
GQE, equivalent to the accommodations provided in her IEP and
that had been previously afforded to her. Despite this discrepancy
of facts, the court failed to discuss why Rene hinged on that
particular administrative hearing. 155
III.The Chapman Lawsuit
A. Facts
The three named plaintiffs in Chapman v. California Department
of Education156 were students with disabilities who had taken and
failed, or would have taken, the CAHSEE. Each qualified for special
education and for protection under the IDEA, and each had an IEP
in place that required various accommodations to ensure his or her
scholastic success. Plaintiff Juleus Chapman was a thirteen-year-old
ninth-grader with severe dyslexia. 5 7 His IEP required that he be
given extra time to take any required exam, he be allowed to listen
to test questions being read to him, and be permitted use of a laptop
computer and calculator when needed. 158 His IEP required that he
be given extra time to take any required exam, and be permitted use
of a laptop computer and calculator when needed. 159 Plaintiff Ryan
Smiley, a fourteen-year-old with dyslexia and dysgraphia 160 took the
CAHSEE in March 2001 but also did not receive his full
151. Id. at 747.
152. Id. at 746.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 746 n.ll (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., No. 01-01780, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2003).
157. Complaint at 6-7, Chapman (No. 01-01780).
158. Id. at 11.
159. Id. at 11-12.
160. "Dysgraphia impairs an individual's ability to write legibly in a defined space
over a normal timeframe." Id.
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accommodations delineated in his IEP.161 Neither Ryan nor his
162
parents were told how to obtain or request accommodations.
Plaintiff Jessica Lyons asserted that she would probably require an
alternate assessment because of her dyslexia. Despite her assertion
that she needed an alternative assessment, she was told that she was
required to take the CAHSEE even though the district official did
not know if accommodations would be allowed or whether, if
Jennifer used those accommodations, her score would be
163
invalidated.
Plaintiffs Question the CAHSEE Because They Did Not
Provide Appropriate Accommodations
The Chapman plaintiffs asserted that the CAHSEE discriminated
against students with disabilities on four grounds. First, there was
no alternate assessment, as required in the IDEA, for students with
disabilities to exhibit their knowledge. 164 Second, California offered
request
to
students
disabled
enabling
procedure
no
accommodations for the exam. 165 Third, the test administrators
provided no process to appeal denials of accommodation
requests. 166 Finally, the exam was discriminatory because the
disabled plaintiffs were being tested on material that they had not
yet been taught. 167 The fourth claim was based on constitutional
challenges under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Seeking to meet the relevant constitutional standards,
the plaintiffs attempted to show that 1) the exams infringed on one
or more constitutionally protected interests, 2) the exams were not
"legitimate and reasonable," 3) the plaintiffs did not receive
adequate notice, and 4) the exam was "fundamentally unfair." 168
B.

161. Id. at 12-13. Ryan's IEP ensures that a reader will be provided to him for
examinations. During the CAHSEE a reader was not provided during the English
portion of the exam; furthermore he was not permitted to use his Alphasmart computer
program on one of the two essays. He was entitled to both accommodations in his IEP.
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 16-17.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Chapman
(No. 01-01780). Note that the court focused on the discrimination claims. However, the
court stated that "[p]laintiffs have limited case law supporting the proposition that it is a
violation of due process to test students on material they have not had an adequate
opportunity to learn." Order Re: Preliminary Injunction at 9, Chapman (No. 01-01780).
The court concluded that "[p]laintiffs' arguments regarding test validity boil down to a
battle of experts," and at that point in the case, the court could not make a determination
on the experts. Id.

Fall 20041

A HIGH STAKES MISTAKE

C. Arguments of Defendant California Department of Education
The California Department of Education (CDE) made several
These
arguments combating plaintiffs' various assertions.
arguments included two public policy contentions. First, the CDE
asserted that the CAHSEE would benefit all students in California
because it would improve the quality of education available to
students and ensure that a "high school diploma [was] more than a
piece of paper." 169 A diploma would attest to employers and
colleges that a California high school graduate had achieved
appropriate levels of competency in the areas of reading, writing,
and mathematics. 170 The CDE argued that the court should give
judicial deference to the CDE concerning educational issues and
standards. 171 Since the CAHSEE is an educational standard, the
CDE would, therefore, have the authority to implement high stakes
tests.172
Additionally, the CDE asserted that its accommodations policy
did not violate federal laws for several reasons. The CDE argued
that it was within the state's authority to limit the accommodations
afforded to disabled students in connection with their completion of
district-wide assessments. 173 The first reason the CDE could limit
the accommodations on the CAHSEE stemmed from the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting the IDEA.174
Although Congress desired to provide specialized education
services to disabled children, Congress did not specifically impose
"any particular substantive standard upon the states." 175 Therefore,
the CDE concluded, it had the authority to establish statewide
education standards, institute statewide examinations designed to
measure a student's academic competence, and use the results from
these examinations to help determine if a student should receive a
diploma. 176
The second reason the CDE could limit the accommodations on
the CAHSEE was derived from the federal regulations explaining
According to the Code of Federal Regulations,
the IDEA.
"[children] with disabilities are included in general State and
169. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Chapman (No. 01-01780) [hereinafter P. & A.].
170. Id.
171. Id. at 12.
172. Id. at 11-12; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43
(1973); Hoeft v. Tuscon, 967 F.2d 1298, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1992).
173. P. & A., supra note 169, at 23.
174. Id. at 13.
175. Id.; Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).
176. P. & A., supra note 169, at 23.
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district-wide assessment programs with appropriate accommodations
and modifications in administration, if necessary."177 Defendants
concluded that the words "appropriate" and "necessary" would
give the state and local education agencies further discretion to
determine which accommodations would be afforded to disabled
students in connection with their completion of district-wide
assessments.1 78 Therefore, the CDE argued that because of the
"appropriate" and "necessary" language in the federal regulations,
the CDE had authority to require special education students to pass
the CAHSEE to earn their diploma.
The CDE's third argument for limiting accommodations on the
CAHSEE was that these types of accommodations would invalidate
the test results.17 9 The CDE asserted it offered the widest range of
accommodations that would not fundamentally alter what the test
was trying to measure. 180 For example, because the exam attempted
to measure a student's reading skills, the CDE would not provide a
reader18 ' for the portion of the exam that tested reading
comprehension. Thus, the CDE believed it was doing everything
within its power to provide the most appropriate accommodations
182
without invalidating the test's results.
The CDE maintained it met the alternate assessment
requirement of the IDEA with its waiver policy. 183 This waiver
policy permitted students that took the CAHSEE with the
unapproved accommodations 184 an opportunity to still receive a
diploma. 185 The waiver policy provided that a student who passed
the CAHSEE with accommodations could receive a diploma if her
in-class performance demonstrated sufficient knowledge and
skill.' 86 In such an instance, the local school district or the local
education agency could request a waiver to the CAHSEE
requirement for a student who required accommodations that
187
fundamentally altered what the CAHSEE is designed to measure.
The CDE made two additional factual claims. First, the CDE
argued the CAHSEE was consistent with federal law because it was
being developed and carefully monitored to ensure that it met legal
177. Id. at 23 (alteration in original); 34 C.F.R. § 300.138(a) (2001).
178. P. & A., supra note 169, at 23.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 23-24.
181. A reader is someone who reads test questions to a student.
182. Defendant's Brief at 23-24.
183. Id. at 26.
184. Accommodations that could invalidate a student's score. For example a reader,
spell-checker, or a calculator.
185. Defendant's Brief at 27.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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and professional standards for validity1 8 8 and reliability.189 Second,
requiring the CAHSEE as a condition for graduation would be
consistent with due process requirements because students would
have had an adequate and substantial opportunity to learn the
material tested. 190
D. The District Court Ruled Disabled Students Would Be
Afforded Appropriate Accommodations
At the outset, the court acknowledged that generally courts
should defer to educators with regard to questions of education
policy and academic standards.1 91 However, whether the state was
complying with the IDEA and respecting constitutional due process
rights remained within the court's purview. 192 First, the court
considered whether the state must offer an alternate assessment
under the IDEA. It cited the IDEA to require:
Children with disabilities are included in general State and
district-wide
assessment
programs,
with
appropriate
accommodations, where necessary. As appropriate, the State or
local educational agency - (i) develops guidelines for the
participation of children with disabilities in alternate assessments
for those children who cannot participate in State and district-wide
assessment programs; and (ii) develops and, beginning
not later
93
than July 1, 2000 conducts those alternate assessments.
Despite the lack of case law defining an alternate assessment under
the IDEA, the court found that the State had failed to provide any
form of assessment alternative to the CAHSEE and that disabled
students were entitled to an assessment of their abilities. 94 The
court also found it irrelevant that some students were incapable of
mastering the topics tested on the CAHSEE. Nonetheless, the court
ruled, all students were "still entitled to a valid assessment of their
188. A test meets the professional standard for validity when the exam tests materials
and concepts it purports to measure and "lead to inferences that are appropriate and
meaningful." Morrison, supra note 15, at 1151.
189. Defendant's Brief at 25-26. A test meets the professional standard for reliability if
the exam comports with state curriculum standards, measures multiple performances of
the students, and tests students with "diverse learning needs." Morrison, supra note 15,
at 1151.
190. Id. at 26.
191. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., (No. 01-01780) at 3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21 2002); see
also Brookhart v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983); Debra P. v.
Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
192. Id.
193. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(17)(A) (2004) (emphasis added).
194. See Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., (No. 01-01780) at 6.
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capabilities." 195
In its discussion of which accommodations should be available
to a disabled student taking the CAHSEE, the court held the CDE
must provide appropriate accommodations as delineated in a
student's IEP. 196 The court noted that the IDEA requires that
"[c]hildren with disabilities are included in general State and
appropriate
with
programs,
assessment
district-wide
97
the phrase
In
analyzing
accommodations, where necessary."
"appropriate accommodations," the court observed that under the
IDEA, the most logical place to determine "appropriate
accommodations" would be the student's IEP. However, the court
1 98
found "the IDEA does not explicitly incorporate this definition."
During further analysis of the meaning of "appropriate
accommodations," the court acknowledged the CDE argument in
Rene v. Reed. 199 The court disagreed with Rene v. Reed and
maintained that the Indiana Court of Appeals had erred and
"reached its conclusion with little analysis." 200
The court concluded that an "appropriate accommodation,"
benefiting disabled students taking the CAHSEE, would be "any
accommodation necessary to render a student's score on the
CAHSEE a meaningful measure of that student's academic
achievement." 201 Furthermore, the court found that the IEP team
was the best entity to gauge a student's academic status and whose
recommendations for accommodations should be allowed her when
202
taking the CAHSEE.
The Ninth Circuit Reversed the District Court's Preliminary
Injunction Holding the Plaintiffs' Claims Were Not Ripe for
Adjudication
The defendants appealed the federal district court's preliminary
injunction to the Ninth Circuit. 20 3 The Ninth Circuit overturned the
district court's preliminary injunction because it found that most of
the plaintiffs' claims were not ripe for adjudication. 204 In accordance
E.

195. Id.
196. Id. at 8.
197. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(17)(A)(2004); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.138 (2001).
198. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., (No. 01-01780) at 8.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 9.
202. Id.
203. Smiley v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., No. 02-15552, No. 15553, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
18466 (9th Cir. Sep. 4, 2002). By the time the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case, Juleus
Chapman was no longer a plaintiff, thus, the case name of the case was Smiley v.
CaliforniaDepartment of Education.
204. Id.
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with the Ninth Circuit's decision, the district court issued a second
decision on March 12, 2003, determining which of the plaintiffs'
claims were ripe for adjudication and which claims were to be
dismissed. 205
The Ninth Circuit enumerated three main reasons why the
student plaintiffs' claims regarding the administration of the
CAHSEE were not yet ripe. 206 The court stated that the plaintiffs'
claims were not yet ripe because they "allege potential future harms
caused by the possible denial of a waiver of CAHSEE requirements
or of a diploma."207 The appellate court supported its finding that
the mere possibility of a denial of a waiver was a future harm
because the defendant CDE would not deny waivers until the
CAHSEE and the waiver process was refined. 208 According to the
court, the CDE needed "experience with the administration of the
CAHSEE to further develop and refine the test." 209 Further, they
needed the time and experience "to decide whether there should be
a delay in the date for imposing it as a requirement for a high school
diploma." 210 The CDE also needed time and experience to "[work]
out the waiver process by which the students with disabilities may
obtain diplomas." 211 Although the court held in December of 2002
that the claims were not ripe because the CDE needed time to refine
the test, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the district court stated how
long the defendant needed to refine the test or when the claims
would become ripe.
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' claim that the IDEA
required the State to provide an alternate assessment was also not
ripe. 212 However, it neglected to state a reason why the claim was
not ripe. Nor did the court say when the claim would be ripe. The
Ninth Circuit merely stated, "plaintiffs' claim regarding alternative
assessment is also insufficiently ripe for adjudication on a statewide
basis at the present time." 213 On remand, the district court clarified
by stating that "so long as enforcement of the exit exam requirement
remains a mere contingency, the state need not provide an alternate
assessment. 214

205. Smiley v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., No. 02-15552, No. 02-15553, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
26516 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2002).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 474-75.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 474.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 475.
213. Id.
214. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., (No. 01-01780) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2003) at 5-6.
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On remand, the district court followed the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning and stated that "since the state now permits learning
disabled students to take the CAHSEE with all necessary
accommodations and modifications ...none of the plaintiff's [sic]
claims regarding test administration are ripe." 215 The district court
then concluded that the only claims that could be ripe and
adjudicated must "not pertain to test administration, the potential
future denial of a diploma, or the development of an alternate
2 6
assessment." 1

Similarly, the district court interpreted the Ninth Circuit's
ruling to hold the due process claims were also not ripe. 217 It noted
that for a due process claim to survive, the plaintiff must have been
deprived of a fundamental interest. 218 In this case, no student has
yet been deprived of a diploma. 219 Since there has not yet been a
deprivation of a property interest, the court held the due process
claims were not ripe because it was a threat of a future harm.220

IV.Commentary
In its ruling on the preliminary injunction the court signaled its
preference for deferring to the IEP in accommodating students
taking high stakes exams. Since the IDEA and applicable case law
comprehensively delineate the team's duties and provide implicit
support for giving it a central role in shaping a student's educational
215. Id. at 4 (emphasis original).
216. Id. The narrow claim the Ninth Circuit found ripe was the issue of meaningful
access to the test. Although the plaintiffs were permitted to take the CAHSEE with
accommodations and modifications, the court found that the ambiguous waiver policy
did not allow for meaningful access. The Ninth Circuit held that uncertainty of whether
the disabled student should take the CAHSEE with accommodations and risk not being
granted a waiver versus whether the student should risk failing the test by taking it
without any accommodations "alleged a real and immediate injury to all learning
disabled students whose IEPs indicate the use of modifications." Smiley, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26516, at 475.
The district court noted on remand the seemingly inconsistent statements
between the plaintiff's "injury" noted above and the appellate court's next statement
that "the IDEA does not encompass restrictions on the state in the exercise of its
traditional authority to set diploma requirements." In reconciling these two statements
by the Ninth Circuit, the district court asked, "what relief, if any, [could plaintiffs obtain]
that would address the problems created by the uncertainty of the waiver process
without encroaching upon the state's 'traditional authority' to set educational
standards." However the district court did not rule on this issue and gave the parties an
opportunity to brief this issue in light of the state's evolving waiver process. Chapman,
(No. 01-01780), Mar. 12, 2003 at 5-6.
217. Id. at 7.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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future, the IEP team is the most appropriate entity to make decisions
affecting the student's graduation alternatives. Since the members
of a student's IEP team work with her on an individual and
consistent basis, they are the most appropriate assessors of her
capabilities and are best able to determine appropriate education
decisions.
In order to truly provide a free and appropriate education the
IEP team is the best guardian to ensure that disabled students'
rights are protected because they most fully understand what would
be a meaningful measure of that student's academic achievement.
To provide a free and appropriate education to a disabled student,
her IEP team needs options to determine what graduation
alternative is most appropriate for her. Possible options could
include an exit exam with or without accommodations, an alternate
assessment, an exam waiver, 221 or a diploma alternate such as a
Certificate of Completion.
Furthermore, the IEP team is effectively situated to guard
against possible due process violations. Since the IEP team is
familiar with the student's course work, it can determine what
might be the most appropriate time for the student to take a high
stakes exam or alternate assessment. The student will not be
required to take a high stakes exam until the IEP team agrees she
has mastered the material covered on the test. This requirement
would help prevent due process violations related to instructional
validity and notice. For example, if a student's IEP team was able to
decide on a CAHSEE date for her after she had completed an
algebra class, she would have had sufficient notice regarding the
contents of the exam. In this way, the CAHSEE would have met the
requirements of curricular and instructional validity with respect to
this student, as required in the California Education Code.2 22 And
even if parents disagree with other IEP team members regarding
appropriate graduation opportunities for their children, the IDEA
provides an established appeal process. 223
221. The court struck down the waiver policy as the CDE has created it. Defendant
CDE argued that the waiver policy it created met the requirement of alternate
assessment as required by the IDEA, but the court disagreed. The problems the court
had with the waiver policy was that the district and not the student/parents applied for
the waiver, the school district has discretion in applying for a waiver on behalf of the
student, and the CDE retains the discretion in determining whether or not to grant a
waiver. Alternatively, a waiver policy putting the power into the hands of the IEP team
bypasses these problems. Under this framework, the IEP team members decide that the
student's knowledge and candidacy for a diploma could be most accurately assessed by
passing grades in the required course work. See Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., (No.
01-01780) (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2002) at 7.
222. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850 (West 2000).
223. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2004); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507 (2001); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE §
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CONCLUSION
The IDEA is the cornerstone of special education law in the
United States. The IDEA's primary purpose is to compel states to
provide a "free and appropriate education" to all eligible students.
The IDEA features several requirements designed to guarantee free
and appropriate education to disabled students including: an IEP
plan, accommodations and/or modifications for any district-wide
assessment, and an available alternate assessment where the districtwide assessment is not an appropriate measure of a disabled
student's knowledge and ability.
In response to the national concern of educational standards in
the United States, California was one of the first states to implement
a statewide high stakes high school exit exam. The California
Education Code provides for remediation services for disabled and
non-disabled students who do not exhibit "sufficient progress
toward passing the [CAHSEE]," which would encompass students
who have been provided accommodations in their IEPs.
The federal district court held generally that courts should defer
to educators with regard to questions of education policy and
academic standards. However, whether the state was complying
with the IDEA and respecting constitutional due process rights
remained within the court's purview. In its discussion of which
accommodations should be available to a disabled student taking
the CAHSEE, the court held the CDE must provide appropriate
accommodations as delineated in a student's IEP. The court
concluded that an "appropriate accommodation," benefiting
disabled students taking the CAHSEE, would be "any
accommodation necessary to render a student's score on the
CAHSEE a meaningful measure of that student's academic
achievement." Although on appeal the Ninth Circuit overturned
the district court's holding because it found that most of the
plaintiffs' claims were not ripe for adjudication, beginning with the
Class of 2006, once the CDE implements the CAHSEE as a true high
stakes exam and requires successful completion of the exam to earn
a diploma, a disabled student claim will become ripe.
The Chapman case is not over. Although the Ninth Circuit held
that the case is not yet ripe, more plaintiffs will be ready to
challenge the CAHSEE when it becomes a high stakes test and if the
CAHSEE violates federal law. Legal challenges to high stakes
testing are far from over. Many more states plan to implement exit
exams within the next few years. Until this preliminary ruling was
56501 (a) (Deering 2001).
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issued, no court had ordered a state to accommodate students with
cognitive disabilities who were slated to take high stakes exit exams.
The preliminary injunction serves as an indicator of how some
courts may respond to high stakes testing litigation in light of
federal disability laws such as the IDEA. States will continue to
balance the competing interests of educational accountability purportedly ensured through standardized high stakes testing - and
the IDEA's competing need to protect disabled students from an
inappropriate cookie-cutter education.
The court, however,
addressed this balance; the Chapman decision provides a warning
that courts will not - as they should not - ignore federal disability
laws when called upon to balance educational interests.
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